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 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Die Erweiterung und Vertiefung der Europäischen Union schafft neue 
Möglichkeiten auch für die Bildungspolitik. Aufgrund der höheren Mobilität nimmt 
die Verschränkung von Bildungssystemen und regionalen Arbeitsmärkten zu. Die 
Bildungspolitik blickt damit neben den Bildungsinvestitionen und Ergebnisse 
innerhalb eines Landes zunehmend auf die Bildungsprozesse in Europa insgesamt. 
Dennoch gibt es bislang erst wenige Analysen zu optimalen Investitionsstrategien in 
die Humankapitalbildung in Europa, die den ganzen Lebenszyklus umfassen. Die 
vorliegende Studie möchte diese Forschungslücke schließen und zum Verständnis 
alternativer Investitionsstrategien und ihrer Konsequenzen für die Entwicklung des 
Humankapitals in Europa beitragen. Es werden die Wohlfahrtskonsequenzen von 
Strategien untersucht, die entweder auf unterschiedliche Altersgruppen, auf 
spezifische Bildungsgruppen oder Länder fokussieren.  
 
Als theoretische Grundlage dient ein Modell der Humankapitalbildung, das durch 
abnehmende Grenzerträge von Bildungsinvestitionen in einer Periode gekenn-
zeichnet ist, und das dem kumulativen und synergetischen Prozess der Bildung von 
Fähigkeiten im Lebenszyklus Rechnung trägt. Die Parameter, die den Aufbau des 
Humankapitals sowie die Entwicklung der individuellen Einkommen im Lebens-
zyklus und deren Verteilung steuern, werden für 29 Länder Europas mit Hilfe der 
PISA Daten sowie offiziell verfügbarer Statistiken zur Bevölkerung, Alters-
verteilung, Bildungsausgaben, Lebensdauer und Pro-Kopf Einkommen ermittelt. 
Humankapitalentwicklung, Einkommen und Lebenserwartung hängen maßgeblich 
von den Humankapitalinvestitionen in der Kindheit ab, die aus dem familiären und 
schulischen Umfeld resultieren. Im Erwachsenenalter entscheiden die Individuen 
über die optimale Höhe ihrer Bildungsinvestitionen. 
 
Die Ergebnisse der unterschiedlichen Bildungsinvestitionsstrategien werden mit 
einer Wohlfahrtsfunktion bewertet, in der neben dem Ziel der Effizienz das Ziel der 
Gleichheit unterschiedlich gewichtet werden kann. Beispielsweise hat in 
skandinavischen im Vergleich zu angelsächsischen Ländern das Ziel der Gleichheit 
ein höheres Gewicht. Die Bewertung bezieht jeweils die Humankapitalbildung im 
gesamten Lebenszyklus ein, und nicht nur die Ergebnisse von spezifischen 
Bildungsstufen, wie etwa der Hochschul- oder Vorschulbildung.  
 
Als Ergebnis zeigt sich unter anderem, dass mehr Bildungsinvestitionen in die 
Förderung benachteiligter Kinder bereits in der Vorschulzeit getätigt werden sollten, 
wenn das Gleichheitsziel im Vordergrund steht. Auch wenn das Effizienzziel 
Priorität hat, verbessern zusätzliche Investitionen in der frühen Lebensphase für alle 
Kinder die gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt. Falls sowohl die Kosten der Ausbildung wie 
auch die Bildungsertragsfunktion einheitlich in Europa sind, werden Politiken zur 
Verringerung der Ungleichheit von Bildungsinvestitionen effektiver. 
 Nontechnical Summary 
 
Improving the education of youth is one of the most prominent policy goals in 
Europe. While most economists would agree with the aim, the optimal timing and 
the optimal quantity of educational investments are in question.  
 
This paper analyses alternative investment policies and their consequences for the 
evolution of human capital in Europe based on a model of age dependent skill 
formation where the life span depends on investments during childhood. A model is 
calibrated for a population living in 29 European countries in the year 2006. In the 
study Europe is either the sum of these individual countries or it is a hypothetical 
entity constructed from the 29 European countries.  
 
What makes the approach special is the analysis of the returns to education of 
alternative educational policies targeted at certain countries, ages or productivity 
levels for two counterfactual policy regimes, one regime assuming a single labour 
market and the other presupposing the actual state of diversity. In the model, 
investments for young individuals under the age of eighteen years are traced back to 
the family and teaching environment. In adulthood individuals optimize the amount 
of educational investments, given the overall amount of investments in the society. 
We analyse the consequences of each investment policy for human capital formation 
over the whole life cycle and do not focus on specific developmental stages like 
preschool or tertiary education.  
 
The results demonstrate that optimal investment strategies, whether they are oriented 
towards age, regions or skill levels, crucially depend on the weights a society puts 
on equality. If equality is important enough more investment in Europe are needed 
for disadvantaged children during childhood. If the aim of equality is less important, 
additional investments need to be directed more generally to people of younger ages. 
Furthermore, it turns out that high levels of income inequality and a high skill level 
increases the optimal amount of investments, especially during younger adulthood. 
In the case where educational costs and skill premia are modelled as homogeneous 
in Europa the effectiveness of policies to reduce inequality would be higher. 
 
The findings result from the idea of age depended skill formation with decreasing 
learning multiplier over time and decreasing marginal returns to investment in the 
skill production function. Further research is needed first for empirically assessing 
the skill multiplier from childhood in the different European countries with 
improved data. Second, additional research is needed to investigate the welfare 
consequences of public and private investment processes and alternative 
assumptions about their interdependencies. 
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Abstract: 
The paper analyses alternative investment policies and their consequences for the 
evolution of human capital in Europe based on a model of age dependent skill 
formation where the life span depends on investments during childhood. What 
makes the approach special is the analysis of the returns to education of alternative 
educational policies targeted at certain ages, countries, or productivity levels for two 
counterfactual policy regimes, one regime assuming the actual state of diversity and 
the other a unified Europe. Our results indicate that investments need to be directed 
more generally to people of younger ages in Europe. If equality is important enough 
additional investment should specifically be directed to disadvantaged individuals 
during childhood. Furthermore, high levels of life cycle income inequality and a 
high skill level increase the optimal amount of investments during younger 
adulthood. In a unified Europe, the effectiveness of policies to reduce inequality 
would be higher. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists study the formation of human capital over the life cycle and its welfare 
consequences. Teaching is regarded as the major channel for fostering skills and 
human capital. According to political rhetoric educational policies overcome market 
failure in reaching the optimal amount of investment and in addition equalize 
educational opportunities. The European Commission (2010), for instance, 
postulates that improving the education of youth is one of the most prominent policy 
goals in Europe. 
 
While most economists would agree with the aim, the optimal timing and the 
optimal quantity of educational investments are in question. Since deep-seated skills 
are created early in the human developmental process (Amor 2003, Blomeyer et al. 
2009, 2010, Heckhausen and Heckhausen 2008, Heckman 2007, among others) the 
priorities in public educational spending are under scrutiny. The formation of 
cognitive skills, such as intelligence, memory power and reasoning, and self-
regulatory skills, such as motivation, delay of gratification and persistence, begins in 
early childhood, influenced by parent-child interaction. The level of these skills is 
decisive for becoming a productive member of society and for economic 
performance as well (see Cunha and Heckman 2007, 2009, Hanushek and 
Wössmann 2008, among others). 
 
There exists a bunch of public educational programmes covering preschool, primary 
and secondary education in all European countries. Furthermore, governments in 
modern European societies are engaged in post-secondary education as well as 
training and try to promote lifelong learning (OECD 2010, among others). While 
each of these educational programmes receives a great deal of attention in research
1
, 
a comprehensive empirical assessment of the patterns of investment into human 
capital during the life-cycle and its welfare implications under different educational 
regimes in Europe is still not available
2
, mainly for three reasons.  
 
First, counterfactual evidence of alternative human capital investments over the life 
cycle is scarce due to a lack of longitudinal studies ranging from the cradle to the 
grave (see Cunha et al. 2006, among others). Second, policies aiming at fostering 
human capital during childhood will reach part of their expected economic impacts 
only in the following twenty to forty years (see Pfeiffer and Reuß 2008, among 
others). This period is beyond political foresight and children, as a rule have no 
voting power. Third, European countries are responsible for educational and labour 
                                                 
1
 For instance, policy reforms in secondary or postsecondary education have been studied by Bergh and Fink (2009), 
Hunter et al. (2009), Johnson and Turner (2009), Lerner et al. (2008) and Wössmann (2008), among others. 
2
 Heckman and Jacobs (2009) investigate human capital formation from the viewpoint of skill bias and greater 
turbulence in labour markets in Europe. Pfeiffer and Reuß (2008) examine returns to education when skill formation is 
age dependent. Their empirical part focuses on Germany. 
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market policies. These policies differ widely in Europe (see Borgloh et al. 2011, 
among others) and coordination will take time.  
 
Our contribution to the burgeoning literature on life-span human capital formation is 
threefold. We examine welfare implications of alternative educational policies to 
foster human capital based on a version of our model of life cycle skill formation 
(Pfeiffer and Reuß 2008). We extend this model with respect to several aspects. Life 
span now depends on the stream of investments in childhood as is suggested by 
research from Friters et al. (2010), among others. Parameters that determined 
income inequality and economic productivity can now be independently varied in 
the human capital production function. A welfare function assesses the alternative 
educational policies with different weights put on equality. For instance equality is 
more important in Scandinavian countries, compared to countries within Europe. 
The model is calibrated for a population living in 29 European countries in the year 
2006.  
 
Another innovative feature of our analysis is the examination of welfare 
implications of various educational policies for a counterfactual policy regime. One 
policy regime represents the actual status of labour market diversity the other 
assumes the hypothetical state of a single labour market in Europe. We analyse 
alternative educational investment strategies aligned to specific regions, ages and 
productivity levels for each of these two policy regimes.  
 
The study demonstrates that additional investment should be shifted to the young 
population with low investments and low productivity if equality within the society 
is important in the welfare function. If the aim of equality is less important, 
additional investments need to be directed more generally to people of younger ages. 
The welfare effects of educational investments are higher in a single labour market if 
equality is more important. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces the relevant data and the 
considered European countries. Section three discusses the model of skill and human 
capital formation and section four the calibration of the functions with the data. 
Section five highlights the welfare implications of alternative educational 
investment strategies. Section six concludes. 
2. Data sources and descriptive findings  
In what follows Europe consists either of the following 29 countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Alternatively, Europe is a hypothetical 
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entity constructed from these 29 European countries. Since currently there is no 
political entity for these 29 countries and aggregate official statistics are not 
available, these have been created from different sources. The 29 European countries 
have been selected such that data on educational outcomes and investment costs, 
demographics, GDP and the inequality of income are available.
3 4
  
 
Table 1 displays the population size, age structure (below 18, above 65 years old), 
educational expenditures as well as the GDP and income inequality for the 
hypothetical Europe as well as the mean, minimum and maximum values for the 29 
individual countries. The countries differ significantly in many of the examined 
characteristics. For instance, the number of inhabitants varies between 300 000 in 
Iceland and 82.4 million in Germany. Overall 508.7 million people live in Europe. 
In most European countries the middle-aged group is the largest one. The fraction of 
inhabitants below the age of 18 varies between 16.1% (Italy) and 24.9% (Iceland). 
In Scandinavian countries and France the fraction is above 20%, whereas in 
Germany and Spain, among others, it is less than 17%. This divergent age patterns 
have implications for educational policies. 
 
Table 1: Population size, age distribution, educational expenditures, GPD/capita and 
income inequality for Europe and the 29 European countries 
 
 Population 
fraction 
below 18 
fraction 
above 65 
Public 
b)
 
educational 
expenditures 
GDP/ 
capita
 b)
 
 
Quintile 
Income 
Ratio 
Europe  508 678 000 18.5% 17.6% 5 631 € 22 329 € 6.05 
Mean
 a)
 17 540 620 19.0% 16.6% 5 769 € 23 168 € 4.67 
Min.
 a)
 299 891 16.1% 11.9% 1 453 € 8 307 € 3.40 
Max.
 a)
 82 437 995 24.9% 20.8% 12 168 € 62 268 € 7.90 
Source: OECD.stat (2009), own calculations, see text. 
a)
 These row shows the respective mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values from the 29 countries. 
b)
 Euro, real values 
2006. 
GDP per capita varies from 8 307 € (Croatia) to 62 268 € in Luxembourg, showing 
significant disparities in Europe. European countries have around 18 million 
inhabitants on average and the hypothetical European has an average GDP per capita 
of 22 329 €. Inequality is measured with the ratio of overall income of the 20 
percent of population with the highest income (highest quintile) to the overall 
                                                 
3
 GDP per capita is calculated for Euro 2006 values using PPP from OECD.stat (2009). The overall population sizes, 
the age structure and measures of income inequality have been taken from Eurostat (2010). 
4
 Turkey has not been included, although data are available. Turkey has been excluded from the study, because most 
of the territory of Turkey belongs to Asia. Since Turkey has a comparatively young and large population, the inclusion 
of Turkey would have made a difference. 
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income of the 20 percent of the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile), 
taken from Eurostat (2009). Income inequality varies from 3.4 (Denmark) to 7.9 
(Latvia). In the hypothetical Europe inequality is as high as 6, much higher than the 
simple average of the inequality measurers suggest. Therefore, inequality in the 
hypothetical Europe is higher, for instance, than in the US. With respect to average 
GDP per capita and inequality the hypothetical Europe is more similar to Greece 
than to France, Germany or Sweden, for instance.  
 
These observations would have implications if a unification of educational policy 
took place. For instance, educational expenditures presumably would change in case 
of a majority rule. Currently annual public educational expenditures (taken from 
OECD 2010) differ widely, between 1 453 € per student in Romania and Denmark, 
Norway or Luxembourg where expenditures exceed 10 000 € per student.  
 
The measure of educational performance has been taken from PISA scores 2006 
(OECD 2006) averaged for math, science and reading and in each of the 29 
countries. Table 2 compares the resulting average PISA scores for Europe and 
summarizes the mean, and the minimum and maximum values for the 29 European 
countries.  
 
Table 2: The distribution of PISA scores for Europe  
and the sample of 29 European countries 
Percentile 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 
Europe 332.7 367.4 426.7 490.7 557.9 607.5 634.9 
Mean
 a)
 343.2 375.7 431.2 490.9 553.5 600.8 626.4 
Min.
 a)
 263.2 290.9 344.5 407.6 462.3 511.6 538.4 
Max.
 a)
 425.5 454.6 504 556.5 606.6 645.9 669.9 
Source: Own calculations, see text. 
a)
 These rows show the respective mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values for 29 countries.  
The inequality in educational performance in Europe is higher than the country 
specific inequality. On average educational performance is high in Finland (556.5) 
and the Netherlands (521) and low in Romania (407.6) and Bulgaria (417). As a 
rule, the inequality of educational performance is inversely related to the average 
PISA score. For instance, the 90-10 PISA ratio is 2 in Romania compared to 1.5 in 
Finland. There is a wide variety of educational expenditures per PISA score. For 
instance Norway investment is about 25 €, while it is only 5 € in Croatia. 
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3. Skill and human capital formation over the life cycle 
The model of human capital formation consists of six equations, introduced in this 
section. Equation one and two govern skill development, equation three the 
formation of human capital formation from the age of zero to 18. Equation four 
governs the transformation of human capital into income, while equation five deals 
with the optimal investment into human capital from age 18 to 65. Equation 6 
contains the welfare function of the society.  
 
There are two skills and two equations for skill formation, one for cognitive skills, 
C
tS , and one for non-cognitive or self-regulatory skills, 
N
tS  (see equation 1, 2). These 
two difference equations specify skill formation and depreciation on an annual basis 
over the life span with individual n, living in country j. It is assumed that returns to 
education depend on age. Investment later in life is not able to enhance the skill 
level as much as in early childhood, even though the higher skill level may 
complement investment. In order to reflect age-dependent processes, two learning 
multipliers are added determining the person’s learning aptitude, one for cognitive, 
C
tl , and one for self-regulatory skills, 
N
tl , respectively (introduced in Pfeiffer and 
Reuß 2008). The learning multipliers depend on age in a way that is regarded to be 
consistent with neurobiological and psychological findings from the child 
development literature cited in the introduction (see Cunha and Heckman 2007, and 
Heckman 2007, among others).  
1
, , 1, , 1, , , , 1 1, ,
1 1 1
(1 )
3 3 3
k k k j k k
t n j t t n j t n j t n j t t n jS l S S I S
  
   
 
          
 
    (1, 2) 
with 
1
1
( 1 )
t
as le t
  
  
, k=C,N  and j=C if  k=N, j=N if k=C and , , 0
k
t i jS  .  
The first term of equations (1, 2) represents skill formation with a CES production 
function. Next period skills are produced by both types of skills and investment. The 
parameter   determines the degree of complementarity among skills and investment 
and can vary from 1 (complete substitutes) to   (complete complements). For 
0   the production function is of the Cobb Douglas type. The second part of 
equations (1, 2) introduces skill losses. Depreciation of skills is modest in childhood 
and accelerates with increasing age, assuming a life span of le years. The life span 
depends on the amount of investment (the family environment) during childhood. as 
is a parameter introduced to govern the dynamics of deprecation. If as  is larger than 
1, skill depreciation accelerates towards the end of the life span. In the last period, 
the individual loses all skills (and dies). For the analyses a value as=5.85 is used. In 
that case, equations (1, 2) imply self-productivity ( 2 1/ 0
k kS S   ; this is true for 1as ) 
and direct complementarity ( 2 1/ 0
k k j
t t tS I S     ) resulting from the CES production 
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function as long as 1   (Cunha and Heckman 2007). A detailed discussion of the 
production function is given in Pfeiffer and Reuss (2008). 
In the following sections two variants of the model (scenario 1 and 2) are studied.  
 
The formation of human capital in a given year is modelled as a function of 
cognitive and self-regulatory skills taking into account that human capital may 
accumulate or depreciate, for example, due to technological progress. Hence  
, , , , , , 1 1, ,(1 )
C N H
t n j A t n j t n j t t n jH S S H        ,       (3) 
where CtS and 
N
tS  are defined in equations (1, 2). Human capital depreciates 
according to Ht H t    , where H  is a parameter that may vary among individuals, 
jobs, industries or over time. A high value of 
H  induces an early human capital 
maximum (e.g., in sports); a small
H , a later maximum (as, for example, in science). 
It is assumed that this basic structure explains human capital formation in all 
European countries. 
 
However, the countries differ in their skill premium and their distribution of income 
relative to the skill heterogeneity due to differences in the functioning of labour 
market and considerations about equity, among others. In one country an individual 
with a certain human capital level will therefore earn less than he or she would earn 
in another country. Besides that in some countries human capital heterogeneity is 
small relative to the income heterogeneity, whereas in other countries it is rather 
large. In the model, individual income results from the individual human capital and 
the cumulated income of the country as follows: 
, ,
*
, , , , , ,
1
, ,
1
(1 )
j
j
j
j
t n j
N
jk
t n j j t n j t n j
N
n
t n j
n j
H
H
Y I H
H
H





 
       
 
   


     (4) 
with jN  being the population of each country j. Two parameters are employed to 
model income patterns: j  reflects the transformation of human capital into income. 
E.g. if 1j  , one unit of human capital in the country will earn one Euro. Hence the 
sum of human capital in a country will always be the same sum in Euros. For 
another example, if 2j  , one unit of the human capital will earn two Euros.  
 
Individual income depends on the parameter j . The right hand side of equation (4) 
includes the ratio individual to average human capital. For the average individual n, 
the terms equal one for any j . For individuals whose human capital differs from the 
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mean, j  will either lead to an income above or below the average resulting from the 
stock of human capital. If 0j  , all individuals in one country will earn the same 
amount of money irrespective of their particular skill levels. If 1j  , individuals 
will earn exactly their level of human capital times j . As lim j  , the person 
with the highest level of human capital will earn all the income generated in a 
country.  
 
Until the age of 18, the investments 1...18, ,
k
i jI  are assumed to depend on family 
background and teaching. Investments are assumed to vary in such a way that it 
explains student performance. The calibration of the parameters is discussed in 
section 4. After the age of 18 years individuals are assumed to choose the amount of 
investment that maximises their expected lifetime income. They can either invest 
*
, ,
k
t n j
I  units into their skills (see equation 5) or earn an income at the labour market 
with the available level of human capital. If the available time is invested in 
education, no income can be earned. Individuals are assumed to maximize the 
following function (5): 
* * * *
65
, , 1, 2,... 1, 2,... , , , ,*
, , 18
18
* 0.5 *, (
arg max
(1 )
( ) )C N C N
t n j t t t t t n j t n jk
t n j t
t
jY CI I I I
I
r
   




  
 
 
 ,  (5) 
where r=0.02 denotes a discount factor of 2 per cent and parameter Cj represents the 
cost of one unit of education for country j. After the age of 65 all investments will be 
zero because income cannot be earned anymore after that age. As the number of 
people living in each country (Nj) is large and the individual impact is only 
marginal, it is assumed that individuals cannot influence the average human capital 
level of their country ( jH ) or the sum of human capital in their country ( , ,
1
jN
t n j
n
H

 ). 
Under that assumption equation (5) is solved and the individual amount of 
investment has been calculated.  
 
To assess alternative educational policies, the following welfare function is used for 
our population (Sen et al. 1997): 
1
( ) (1 ( ))
N
n
i
W Y A Y y

   , with                         (6) 
1
1
1
1
1
1
( ) 1
N
n
J
n
j
j
y
A Y
N








 
  
    
  
 
 


.               
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Aε denotes the Atkinson index (Atkinson 1970), which illustrates the trade-off 
between efficiency and equality in educational policy.  The index is a discrete 
measure of inequality for an income distribution of a population with N European 
citizens. The equation 
65
18
i t t
t
y r Y

   represents the discounted individual income 
accumulated over the working life, factor   denotes the average human capital of the 
population and   is a parameter for different degrees of equity preferences in the 
society. Assuming 0  , a society does not care about equity at all. For    , the 
index depends only on the welfare of the poorest individual within the society. The 
Atkinson Index is normalized between 0 and 1. If ( ) 0A Y  , no inequality is 
measured in the distribution, while inequality is at its maximum if ( ) 1A Y  .  
The society is assumed to maximize function (6) for the life-cycle welfare of the 
European population. Educational policies are restricted by scarcity exogenously. In 
the case of 0   the society will only maximize the sum of income without 
considering inequality. On the other hand, if lim  , only the income of the 
poorest person in the society is relevant for governing educational policies. In social 
reality equity considerations may vary between 0.5 1.5   (Atkinson 1970). 
4. Calibration of model parameters 
To investigate educational policies in Europe, several model parameters have to be 
calibrated with existing data. In order to test the sensitivity of the analysis and to 
take policy regimes properly into account, some parameters have been calibrated for 
two different cases. In the first one, Europe consists of heterogeneous labour 
markets and educational costs, in the second one, a homogeneous labour market and 
homogenous educational costs are presumed. In a first step, the PISA-scores for all 
individuals i younger than 18 years in each country j have been obtained by a cubic 
spline interpolation (De Boor 1978). The PISA-score at age 15 ( 15P ) is assumed to 
result from cognitive and self-regulatory skills: 
C N
15,i, j P 15,i, j 15,i, jP S S    .                (7) 
Equation (7) explains the potential performance of an individual in performing a 
task as a function of her cognitive and self-regulatory skills at the age of 15 years. 
Both skills are necessary to complete the task successfully and may interact in 
complex ways. A person with a high (low) level of cognitive skills could produce 
low (high) results if her motivation is low (high). Performance is modelled by means 
of a Cobb Douglas function with equal weights for cognitive and self-regulatory 
skills, since the literature provides evidence for both skills to be equally important 
(Duckworth and Seligman 2005, Heckman 2007, among others). The factor A  is an 
adjustment factor for different normalizations of performance scores and their 
respective distributions. The model is calibrated to reach the PISA 2006 test score 
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distributions for 29 European countries for a population of 100,000 representative 
young Europeans. 
 
Investment levels 0...18, ,
k
i jI  are calculated in a way that in each country the PISA 
distribution is generated by equation (7). Table 3 shows resulting values for 0 
5
. 
They differ from 0.16 to 2.06 demonstrating the inequality of investments which 
stems from the inequalities in the family and teaching environment.  
 
After period 18 investments are assumed to result from equation (5) and the 
heterogeneity of income for the same amount of skills from heterogeneous national 
labour markets. Based on the investments in young age, the parameter j  is 
calibrated such that all working individuals between the age of 18 and 65 years 
annually produce the GDP of the country (the sum of incomes in each country is 
equal to the total GDP). The GDP per capita results from the division of a country’s 
GDP by the number of inhabitants. The parameter j  is calibrated to match the 
observed income inequality in Europe (see table 1). 
 
Table 3: Simulated educational investments 0...18, ,
k
i jI  across the percentiles 
Percentile 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 
0   
Europe  0.16 0.27 0.51 1 1.37 1.8 2.06 
mean 0.2 0.3 0.54 0.98 1.33 1.73 1.97 
Std 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.25 
Min 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.5 0.71 1.03 1.22 
Max 0.51 0.67 0.97 1.39 1.79 2.17 2.41 
 
Table 4 displays the calibrated parameters
6
. j  indicate how much larger income in a 
country is compared to its human capital, j  shows how much larger income 
inequality is compared to human capital inequality. The factor j  is large in high 
income countries like Luxembourg (9.77), Norway and Ireland, which have average 
levels of investments ( 0...18I  being close to 1). The value for j  is low in Poland 
(1.33), Croatia and Romania. 
 
Croatia’s human capital is only slightly below the average but the GDP per capita is 
much lower. Romania, on the other hand, has a low level of human capital leading to 
a low income. j  is high in countries with low human capital inequalities and high 
                                                 
5
 For a more detailed compare Pfeiffer and Reuß (2008). 
6
 Note that values do not vary much between simulations for different values of  . Hence, only the standard case 
0   is documented in Table 4. 
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income inequality, which holds in particular for the Baltic countries (e.g., Latvia has 
the maximum value of 3.63). j  is small in countries with high human capital 
inequalities and low income inequality, for instance in Bulgaria ( 1.42j  ). 
Table 4: Calibrated values of labour market parameters 
for heterogeneous European countries 
Country j  j

 
Europe  3.51 2.71 
mean 3.49 2.41 
min 1.33 1.42 
max 9.77 3.63 
 
If a single European labour market is assumed, there is only one   and one   for all 
countries. The European GDP per capita is 22,367.43 € and the European Quintile 
Ratio is 6. This results in 3.51   and 2.71  . The average value of   is relatively 
high for a homogenous labour market in Europe compared to the average value in 
the case of a heterogeneous labour market ( j =2.41). Thus, if Europe is assumed to 
have a homogenous labour market, higher inequality may result.  
 
Life span depends on investments. The underlying empirical relationship results 
from the following regression for the 29 countries:  
log( ) log( / )
0 1
le GDP capita                                                                         (8) 
The total population size is used as a weight. The estimated value of 
1  is 0.07 and is 
significant at the 99% level, uncovering a strong relationship between educational 
investment (indicated by GDP per capita) and average life span in the sample of 
European countries. All combinations of income and life span that result from the 
estimation of parameter 
1  in equation (8) yield the function le(I) (see figure 1).  
 
The relationship between investment and le in the model has an impact on two 
subsequent calibrations, although it is rather moderate. Life cycle skill formation is 
illustrated graphically in Figure 2.  
 
The figure considers all countries and demonstrates their heterogeneity. In the upper 
left it shows cognitive skills for a population of 100,000 representative European 
individuals of one age cohort for 0  . All individuals are assumed to start with the 
same stock of cognitive skills, i.e. a value of 180, but receive divergent investments 
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until the age of 18 years
7
. As can be seen in this figure, cognitive skills peak in the 
early 20s and then decline continuously. The maximum values vary between more 
than 700 and less than 400 skill units in the population. Individuals with fewer 
educational investments and a lower skill level have a shorter life span.  
 
Figure 1: Relationship between educational investments and life span 
 
The beginning of the decline in cognitive skill depends on the life span. In the case 
of self-regulatory skills, all individuals start with the value of 180, too, but skills 
peak later, namely between the ages of 50 and 60 years. Because these skills are 
assumed to be more malleable throughout childhood (Cunha and Heckman 2007, 
Caspi et al. 2005), their heterogeneity resulting from parental investments varies 
between less than 300 and more than 1000. 
 
In the lower left part of figure 2, the development of human capital of a European 
population cohort is shown across its life span. For given human capital, the figure 
shows the incomes that an individual could receive if he or she worked full time 
between the ages of 18 and 65 years.  
 
In contrast to skills, income does not only depend on parental investments during 
childhood, but also on conditions stemming from the labour market and the general 
productivity in a country. In some countries such as Luxembourg and Norway, 
income is high relative to human capital, while in others, such as Poland and 
Romania it is low.  
 
Human Capital is produced by both cognitive and self-regulatory skills and peaks 
between the ages of 40 and 57 years. As individuals with higher skills live longer, 
they reach their maximum income later in life. In skill-intensive, high-income 
professions income peaks up to 17 years later than in low-income professions. 
 
                                                 
7
 For a discussion of different initial conditions see Pfeiffer and Reuß (2008). 
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Figure 2: Cognitive and noncognitive skills, human capital  
and investments in adulthood 
 
In the lower right part of figure 2 the amount of educational investments in 
adulthood that individuals choose to maximize their expected lifetime income is 
shown. Generally, individuals experience a trade-off: They have to decide to either 
start working or invest more in their education.  
 
In early adulthood when returns to education are high, individuals tend to invest 
more in their education. The amount decreases with age and becomes negligible 
with the time. Individuals with higher human capital tend to invest more in 
education at young age, which is in line with the literature (see Pfeiffer and Reuß 
2008, among others).  
 
Individuals in countries with a high income inequality also tend to invest more in 
education. In Lativa for instance, where income quintile ratio is larger than 7, 
individuals invest on average 0.19 educational units per year between the ages of 18 
and 65. On the other hand, in countries with a quintile ratio smaller than 4 (e.g., 
Denmark and Switzerland) individuals only invest between 0.05 and 0.07 
educational units. 
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5. Alternative Educational Policies 
5.1. Alternative Policies and Regimes  
We study the welfare consequences of three alternative educational policies for two 
policy regimes in Europe.  
 
Policy one aims at reducing country heterogeneity within Europe. According to this 
policy, each student who is younger than 18 years and comes from a country with 
PISA scores below the average PISA score receives the amount of investments that 
is needed to reach the European average of educational investments during their first 
18 years of life. This amount is greater than zero for all European countries that 
invest less than the mean value of educational investments in Europe. The additional 
investments differ significantly between countries. 
 
Policy two aims at increasing investments at certain ages while treating students of 
all European countries in the same way. In all countries, individuals under the age of 
18 receive an additional education investment either in their preschool or their 
primary or secondary school. By our definition the preschool investment lasts from 
the age of 0 to 5 years, the primary investment from the age of 6 to 11 years and the 
secondary investment from the age of 12 to 17 years. The amount of investments is 
calculated in a way that balances total discounted costs with the expenditures of 
policy one.  
 
Policy three provides educational investments either to the lower, medium or highest 
third of the PISA achievement distribution for the first 18 years of life. The 
investment is calculated in a way assuring that discounted costs resemble those of 
policy one.  
 
The three policies are investigated for two policy regimes. In the first regime, 
European labour markets are assumed to be heterogeneous, hence, 29 different 
countries with distinct parameters j  and j  are used in the model. Educational costs 
differ in each country. In the second regime, there is one homogeneous European 
labour market with one   and one  . In the second regime educational costs are 
assumed to be uniform across Europe. Obviously, these two regimes are idealized 
policy regimes. Reality presumably meets the conditions of a market structure which 
does not correspond completely to one of the suggested regimes. 
5.2. Heterogeneity in European Labour Markets 
Policy one aims at reaching the average level of educational investments in all 
countries. To make such an investment, 0.19% of the total annual European GDP 
(42.31 € per capita) has to be spent. For policy two, the investment amounts to 
0.51% (preschool), 0.57% (primary) and 0.64% (secondary) of the total annual 
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European GDP (113.00 € to 144.00 € per capita annually). These differences result 
from discounting educational spending. All in all, the discounted costs for policy two 
lasting for six years are equal to the costs of policy one lasting for 18 years. The 
annual spending of policy three is equal to the one for policy one. As investment 
costs differ, 0.12 educational units can be invested in the lower and middle third of 
the educational distribution, but only investments of 0.11 educational units can be 
financed for the upper third. Results for costs and returns are documented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Costs and returns for alternative investment policies in policy regime one 
Policy  Duration 
in years 
Investments 
 
Annual average GDP 
per capita increase 
Net income benefit per 
student 
Policy 
one, 
region  
 
Europe 18 0.06 434 € 16 018 € 
Mean 18 0.06 452 € 16 302 € 
Min 18 0 0 € 0 € 
Max 18 0.48 2 489 € 102 725 € 
Policy 
two, 
preschool 
 
Europe 6 0.10 515 € 19 127 € 
Mean 6 0.10 521 € 19 269 € 
Min 6 0.10 199 € 7 799 € 
Max 6 0.10 1 492 € 61 545 € 
Policy 
two, 
primary 
school 
Europe 6 0.12 389 € 13 119 € 
Mean 6 0.12 394 € 13 224 € 
Min 6 0.12 151 € 5 458 € 
Max 6 0.12 1138 € 44 055 € 
Policy 
two, 
secondary 
school  
Europe  6 0.13 207 € 4 583 € 
Mean 6 0.13 209 € 4 587 € 
Min 6 0.13 81 € 818 € 
Max 6 0.13 606 € 18 672 € 
Policy 
three, 
low-
skilled 
Europe  18 0.04 488 € 18 524 € 
Mean 18 0.04 482 € 18 263 € 
Min 18 0.01 116 € 3 639 € 
Max 18 0.08 1 508 € 62 287 € 
Policy 
three, 
medium-
skilled 
Europe  18 0.04 312 € 9 942€ 
Mean 18 0.04 326 € 10 345 € 
Min 18 0.03 122 € 4 577 € 
Max 18 0.04 908 € 33 733 € 
Policy 
three, 
high-
skilled 
Europe  18 0.04 236 € 6 361 € 
mean 18 0.04 240 € 6 379 € 
min 18 0.01 22 € 850 € 
max 18 0.07 596 € 20 536 € 
 
The largest net income effect can be achieved with an additional preschool 
investment (19,127 € per capita), followed by an investment in education for low-
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skilled students under 18 years (18,524 €). Supporting low-skilled individuals 
instead of low-skilled countries leads to higher net benefits. In the long run, the 
largest net income effect (GDP per capita) is about 515 € annually if all cohorts 
benefit from the policy. Hence, spending 113 € per capita annually would result in 
an increase of 515 € if no crowding out of educational investments took place. The 
smallest returns stem from additional investments in secondary education.  
 
Results for inequality are displayed in table 6. The largest effect on the reduction of 
inequality is achieved if investments are directed to the low-skilled as intended by 
policy three (see table 6). If equality considerations become more important in the 
welfare function, supporting the low performing students is a welfare optimizing 
strategy.  
 
Table 6: Changes in inequality for policy regime one 
Policy before policy after policy change 
Policy one, region 6 5.31 -0.69 
Policy two, preschool  6 5.53 -0.47 
Policy two, primary school  6 5.65 -0.35 
Policy two, secondary school  6 5.80 -0.20 
Policy three, low-skilled 6 4.92 -1.08 
Policy three, medium-skilled 6 5.92 -0.08 
Policy three, high-skilled 6 6.30 +0.30 
 
Finally, table 7 summarizes the welfare changes depending on the degree of 
inequality aversion in a society. Societies with a zero inequality aversion (ε=0) 
should shift more investments to younger children (policy two) while societies with 
a greater inequality aversion (ε>0) should support mainly the low performing 
students (policy three, low-skilled). Policy one is dominated by either the first 
variant of policy two or the first variant of policy three. However, policy one is 
always better compared to the second and third variant of policy two and three. 
 
Table 7: Welfare changes in policy regime one depending on inequality aversion   
 0   0.5   1   1.5   
Policy 1 1.45% 1.92% 4.38% 10.82% 
Policy 2, preschool 1.73% 2.33% 5.57% 14.35% 
Policy 2, primary 1.19% 1.61% 3.83% 9.77% 
Policy 2, secondary 0.41% 0.60% 1.54% 4.00% 
Policy 3, low-skilled 1.67% 3.08% 10.65% 32.32% 
Policy 3, medium-skilled 0.90% 0.89% 0.54% -0.73% 
Policy 3, high-skilled 0.58% 0.28% -0.94% -3.30% 
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5.3. Homogeneous Labour Market in Europe 
Although labour market policies are divergent in Europe, tendencies exist to unify 
these policies to a greater extent. The second policy regime therefore might become 
more realistic in the coming decades. One labour market is assumed to exist in 
Europe. Moreover educational costs are the same for all Europeans. The educational 
investments comply with those of the policies described for the heterogeneous 
Europe. Results of investments and net benefits are displayed in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Costs and returns for alternative investment policies in policy regime two 
Policy  Duration 
in years 
Investments 
 
Annual average 
GDP per capita 
increase 
Net income 
benefit per 
student 
Policy one, region Europe 29 18 0.04 385 € 13 554 € 
mean 18 0.04 392 € 13 851 € 
min 18 0 0 € 0 € 
max 18 0.42 4 208 € 148 473 € 
Policy two, 
preschool  
 
 
Europe 29 6 0.10 523 € 19 521 € 
mean 6 0.10 521 € 19 390 € 
min 6 0.10 411 € 14 030 € 
max 6 0.10 715 € 29 136 € 
Policy two, primary 
school  
 
 
Europe 29 6 0.12 395 € 13 396 € 
mean 6 0.12 393 € 13 319 € 
min 6 0.12 311 € 9389 € 
max 6 0.12 534 € 20 155 € 
Policy two, 
secondary school  
 
Europe 29 6 0.13 210 € 4 729 € 
mean 6 0.13 209 € 4 687 € 
min 6 0.13 160 € 2 506 € 
max 6 0.13 284 € 8 127 € 
Policy three, low-
skilled 
 
Europe 29 18 0.04 482 € 18 221 € 
mean 18 0.04 470 € 17 761 € 
min 18 0.01 111 € 3 960 € 
Max 18 0.08 1 107 € 44 075 € 
Policy three, 
medium-skilled 
 
Europe 29 18 0.04 314 € 10 043 € 
mean 18 0.04 322 € 10 307 € 
min 18 0.03 231 € 7 449 € 
max 18 0.04 386 € 12 309 € 
Policy three, high-
skilled 
 
Europe 29 18 0.04 243 € 6 680 € 
mean 18 0.04 241 € 6 624 € 
min 18 0.01 44 € 1 295 € 
max 18 0.07 425 € 11 408 € 
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In case of a uniform Europe the educational investment intended by policy one can 
only be financed to an extent that leads to 93.5% of the average European 
investment due to the fact that education for countries with amounts below the 
average sum of investments becomes more expensive. For policy two, the 
investments amount to 0.51% (preschool), 0.57% (primary) and 0.64% (secondary) 
of the total annual European GDP and are equal to the results for the regime 
assuming a heterogeneous labour market within Europe. For policy three, the annual 
spending complies with the expenditures of policy one. Investments of 0.115 
educational units can be financed for each level of productivity. 
 
Policy one is less attractive because educational costs are now higher in countries 
with below-average education. Policy three, focussing on the students with low 
productivity, is superior to policy one. Policy two, focussing on preschool 
investments, is superior to policy three. In a homogeneous labour market, the 
effectiveness of educational investments aimed at reducing inequality increases, as 
shown in table 9 below. The human capital of the low-skilled increases out of 
proportion and reduces inequality. If additional investments are directed to the high-
skilled students, inequality will rise to 6.36, moderately higher compared to 6.3 in 
regime one (see table 7).  
 
Thus, alternative educational investment strategies have slightly different welfare 
consequences for the two regimes, depending on the degree of inequality aversion in 
a society (see table 10). Societies with a smaller inequality aversion (ε=0) should 
shift more investments to younger children (policy two) while societies with a 
greater inequality aversion (ε>0) should support mainly the low performing students 
(policy three, low skilled). Policy one is dominated by either the first variant of 
policy two or the first variant of policy three, irrespective of the inequality aversion. 
Policy one is furthermore dominated by the second variant of policy two. However, 
policy one is always better compared to the third variant of policy two and the 
second and third variant of policy three. 
 
Table 9: Changes in inequality for policy regime two 
Policy before Policy after Policy change 
Policy one, region 6 5.52 -0.48 
Policy two, preschool  6 5.44 -0.56 
Policy two, primary school  6 5.58 -0.42 
Policy two, secondary school  6 5.77 -0.23 
Policy three, low-skilled 6 4.68  -1.32 
Policy three, medium-skilled 6 6.01 +0.01 
Policy three, high-skilled 6 6.36 +0.36 
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Table 10: Welfare changes in regime one depending on inequality aversion   
 0   0.5   1   1.5   
Policy one, region 1.23% 1.72% 4.38% 12.59% 
Policy two, preschool 1.76% 2.57% 7.06% 19.65% 
Policy two, primary 1.21% 1.77% 4.81% 13.09% 
Policy two, secondary 0.43% 0.66% 1.89% 5.09% 
Policy three, low-skilled 1.65% 3.45% 13.58% 44.37% 
Policy three, medium-skilled 0.91% 0.90% 0.39% -1.56% 
Policy three, high-skilled 0.60% 0.18% -1.58% -4.96% 
6. Conclusion 
The paper analyses alternative investment policies and their consequences for the 
evolution of human capital in Europe based on a model of age dependent skill 
formation where the life span depends on investments during childhood. A model is 
calibrated for a population living in 29 European countries in the year 2006. In the 
study Europe is either the sum of these individual countries or it is a hypothetical 
entity constructed from the 29 European countries. What makes the approach special 
is the analysis of the returns to education of alternative educational policies targeted 
at certain countries, ages or productivity levels for two counterfactual policy 
regimes, one regime assuming a single labour market and the other presupposing the 
actual state of diversity. In the model, investments for young individuals under the 
age of eighteen years are traced back to the family and teaching environment. In 
adulthood individuals optimize the amount of educational investments, given the 
overall amount of investments in the society.  
 
The results demonstrate that optimal investment strategies, whether they are oriented 
towards age, regions or skill levels, crucially depend on the weights a society puts 
on equality. If equality is important enough more investment in Europe are needed 
for disadvantaged children during childhood. If the aim of equality is less important, 
additional investments need to be directed more generally to people of younger ages. 
Furthermore, it turns out that high levels of income inequality and a high skill level 
increases the optimal amount of investments, especially during younger adulthood.  
 
The findings result from the idea of age depended skill formation with decreasing 
learning multiplier over time and decreasing marginal returns to investment in the 
skill production function. Further research is needed first for empirically assessing 
the skill multiplier from childhood in the different European countries with 
improved data. Second, additional research is needed to investigate the welfare 
consequences of public and private investment processes and alternative 
assumptions about their interdependencies.  
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